Phillips v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission: Will the Supreme Court Leave the First Amendment Intact? | Eastern North Carolina Now

    In response to the questioning regarding "Who speaks?," the threshold question, according to Ms. Waggoner, is whether a message is being conveyed through the creation. Is the service provider "engaged in speech"

    The conservative justices considered whether artists can be required to convey messages with which they profoundly disagree, in light of laws requiring that they do so that persons are not discriminated against in the marketplace.

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    MS. WAGGONER: (counsel for Mr. Jack Phillips; opening remarks to the Justices) Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The First Amendment prohibits the government from forcing people to express messages that violate religious convictions. Yet the Commission requires Mr. Phillips to do just that, ordering him to sketch, sculpt, and hand-paint cakes that celebrate a view of marriage in violation of his religious convictions. ("Compelled Speech")

    JUSTICE GINSBURG: What if it's an item off the shelf? That is, they don't commission a cake just for them but they walk into the shop, they see a lovely cake, and they say we'd like to purchase it for the celebration of our marriage tonight. The Colorado law would prohibit that. Would you claim that you are entitled to an exception?

    MS. WAGGONER: Absolutely not. The Compelled Speech doctrine is triggered by compelled speech. And in the context of a pre-made cake, that is not compelled speech. Mr. Phillips is happy to sell anything in his store (that is pre-made). In the context of a product already made, it's already been placed in the stream of commerce in a public accommodation setting. His speech has been completed. Any message he intended to convey in that particular cake (if any at all) was completed at the time he created it. The message, if any at all, was not unique or personal to the buyer....

    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But I thought that the couple was looking at his already pre-designed cakes that he appears to sell without any customization, and they sat down with him, and he said I don't supply cakes of any kind to gay couples So I thought this cake was about his refusal to supply a cake for any same-sex wedding ceremony.

    MS. WAGGONER: Justice Sotomayor, that's not how he responded to the couple. The couple came in and they requested a custom cake for their wedding. At that point, they brought in a folder with all kinds of designs they wanted to discuss rainbow-layered cake. (That's when Mr. Phillips explained that he could not create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage. The couple ended up purchasing a rainbow-layered cake - or received one free). A rainbow-layered cake is certainly expression..... The order imposed by the Commission requires Mr. Phillips to make such a cake. It also requires him to include words and symbols on his cakes. It's that broad. So if, for example, Mr. Phillips had used a Bible verse on a cake in the past, he would be compelled to use that Bible verse in a different context (for same-sex couples).

    JUSTICE GINSBURG: Who else, besides the individuals getting married (and the cake artist) speaks at a wedding?

    MS. WAGGONER: The artist speaks, Justice Ginsburg. It's as much Mr. Phillips's speech as it would be the couples'.

    JUSTICE GINSBURG: Who else then? Who else as an artist? The person who does floral arranging, who owns a floral shop? Would that person also be speaking at the wedding? What about the person who designs the wedding invitations? Or the person who sets the menu for the wedding dinner? What about the jeweler? The hair stylist? The make-up artist?

    JUSTICE KAGAN: - I'm quite serious, actually, about this, because, you know, a makeup artist, I think, might feel exactly as your client does, that they're doing something that's of great aesthetic importance to the wedding and that there's a lot of skill and artistic vision that goes into making a - somebody look beautiful. And why wouldn't that person or the hairstylist - why wouldn't that also count?

    MS. WAGGONER: Because it's not speech. And that's the first trigger point

    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But explain how baking a cake becomes expressive speech, how that medium becomes expressive speech.

    MS. WAGGONER: Certainly not all cakes would be considered speech, but in the wedding context, Mr. Phillips is painting on a blank canvas. He is creating a painting on that canvas that expresses messages, and including words and symbols in those messages. We have someone that is sketching and sculpting and hand designing something, that is creating a temporary sculpture that serves as the centerpiece of what they believe to be a religious wedding celebration, that cake expresses a message.

    JUSTICE BREYER: The reason we're asking these questions is because obviously we want some kind of distinction that will not undermine every civil rights law, including those protecting African Americans and Hispanics, and including everybody who has been discriminated against in very basic things of life, food, design of furniture, homes, (education), and buildings. Now, I've tried to narrow it and specify it to get your answer.

    MS. WAGGONER: Thank you, Justice Breyer. In terms of the test that would be applied, the Court would first ask under the speech analysis, is there speech? And by asking that, you are asking is there something that is being communicated and is it protected?

    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, your client was saying that providing a cake to a same-sex couple was against his free-expression rights because, and his free-exercise rights, because he cannot celebrate that kind of marriage.

    MS. WAGGONER: Mr. Phillips is looking at not the "who" but the "what" in these instances, what the message is.

    JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, actually, counsel, that seems to be a point of contention. The state seems to concede that if it were the message, your client would have a right to refuse. But if it - the objection is to the person, that's when the discrimination law kicks in. That's footnote 8 of the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision. I know you know this. So what do you say to that, that actually what is happening here may superficially look like it's about the message but it's really about the person's identity?

    MS. WAGGONER: I would say that in footnote 8, the court applies an offensiveness policy, which allows the state the discretion to decide what speech is offensive and what is not, and it did not apply that in a fair way to Mr. Phillips, which creates Viewpoint Discrimination, as well as a violation of free exercise - the Free Exercise Clause. But what's deeply concerning is that is not the theory that Respondents (Craig and Mullins) are submitting to this Court today. They believe that they can compel speech, of filmmakers, oil painters, and graphic designers in all kinds of context. If there are no further questions, I would like to reserve the balance of my time.

    2. Compelled Speech for Everyone

    In the exchange with General Francisco, council for the United States, the justices explored the boundaries of the First Amendment. The justices addressed the particular argument advanced by the government that the First Amendment provides "breathing space" (ie, protection) for business owners, including professional artists and those who provide creative and expressive products, to be free to engage in expressive events like a wedding and to be from the compulsion of law to engage in speech which fundamentally offends their religious beliefs and their conscience. Indeed, he pointed out the unique question presented to the Court - The constitutionality of a state law requiring somebody to create speech and contribute that speech to an expressive event to which they are deeply opposed.

    At issue is the understanding and recognition that there is a difference between refusing to express an offensive message and refusing to serve an individual based on an identity (such as race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation).

    Justice Kennedy commented: "If you prevail, could the baker put a sign in his window, we do not bake cakes for gay weddings? Would that not be an affront to the gay community?" General Francisco responded that there are dignity issues at stake on both sides, not just for Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins.

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    GENERAL FRANCISCO: (Council for the United States, as amicus curiae, or "Friend of the Court") Mr. Chief Justice, and may it - may it please the Court: This case raises an important issue for a small group of individuals; namely, whether the state may compel business owners, including professional artists, to engage in speech in connection with an expressive event like a marriage celebration to which they're deeply opposed. In those narrow circumstances, we believe the Free Speech Clause provides breathing space -

    JUSTICE GINSBURG: How narrow is it? Consider Justice Kagan's question. I mean, we've gotten the answer that the florist is in the same place as the cake-maker, so is the person who designs the invitations and the menus. I don't see a line that can be drawn that would exclude the makeup artist or the hairstylist.

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: Well, Your Honor, that's, of course, the question that the Court has to answer at the threshold of every Free Speech Case. Is the thing that's being regulated something we call protected speech? I think the problem for my friends on the other side is that they think the question doesn't even matter. So they would compel an African American sculptor to sculpt a cross for a Klan service

    JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the problem for you is that so many of these examples - and a photographer can be included - do involve speech. It means that there's basically an ability to boycott gay marriages.

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: Well, Your Honor, I think what it boils down to is that in a narrow category of services that do cross the threshold into protected speech - and I do think it's a relatively narrow category that has protection. For example, I don't think you could force the African American sculptor to sculpt a cross for the Klan service just because he'd do it for other religious groups.

    JUSTICE KENNEDY: If you prevail, could the baker put a sign in his window, we do not bake cakes for gay weddings?

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: Your Honor, I think that he could say he does not make custom-made wedding cakes for gay weddings, but would offer most other cakes (non-custom-made cakes) and that would not cross the threshold.

    JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you think that would be an affront to the gay community?

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: Well, Your Honor, I agree that there are dignity interests at stake here, and I would not minimize the dignity interests to Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins one bit, but there are dignity interests on the other side here too.

    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We've always said in our public accommodations law we can't change your private beliefs, we can't compel you to like these people, we can't compel you to bring them into your home, but if you want to be a part of our community, of our civic community, there's certain behavior, conduct you can't engage in.

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: When you force a speaker to both engage in speech and contribute that speech to an expressive event that they disagree with, you fundamentally transform the nature of their message from one that they want to say to one that they don't want to say. As this Court made clear in the Bob Jones case, the IRS could withdraw tax-exempt status from a school that discriminated on the basis of interracial marriage, but I'm not at all sure that it would reach the same result if it were dealing with a Catholic school that limited married student housing to opposite-sex couples only. I think when you get to this case, if you agree with our test - and I know that I have a little bit of an uphill battle in convincing some of you of that. If you agree with our test, I think the heightened scrutiny standard is particularly easy because they're the same interests at stake as were at stake in Hurley. [Hurley v. Irish-American GLB of Boston, 1995. Facts: In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech subordinate to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."]

    JUSTICE GORSUCH: So General, what is the line? How would you have this Court draw the line?

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: I think there are a couple of ways to draw that line, and this is something that the Court has to struggle with in a lot of cases. I think the first way to draw that line is you analogize it to something that everyone regards as traditional art and everyone agrees is protected speech.

    JUSTICE GORSUCH: Like the Jackson Pollock?

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: Exactly. And here you have a cake that is essentially synonymous with a traditional sculpture except for the medium used. But I also think that the Second Circuit's decision in the Mastrovincenzo case provides a good and workable standard when you've got something that is part art and part utilitarian. And what the Second Circuit asks is it predominantly art or predominantly utilitarian? And here people pay very high prices for these highly sculpted cakes, not because they taste good, but because of their artistic qualities.... But I think the point is when you cross that threshold into free speech, the question is can you compel somebody to create and contribute speech to an expressive event.

    JUSTICE KAGAN: What if somebody comes in, it's a baker who's an atheist and really can't stand any religion, and somebody comes in and says I want one of your very, very special, special cakes for a First Communion or for a Bar Mitzvah. And the baker says no, I don't do that. I don't want my cakes to be used in the context of a religious ceremony.

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: Well, if it rises to the level of speech, then I think he has a claim just like that same baker (Phillips) and he could refuse to sculpt that cake.

    Justices refer to decisions of the Second Circuit looking at various factors when a product is both artistic and utilitarian? Is the product primarily artistic or utilitarian? Are people paying for the utilitarian side of it or are they paying for the artistic side of it? What about the price? Does the price reflect more the product's utilitarian feature or its artistic quality?

    JUSTICE BREYER: There's a category of people called artisans. An artisan is a kind of artist. They are in many fields. They are also people who are discriminated against. And we're in a country of minorities, there are many different groups that have been discriminated against. For many years Congress has passed laws saying, at least to the artisans: You cannot discriminate on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation. If we were to write an opinion for you, what would we have done to that principle?

    GENERAL FRANCISCO: Well, Your Honor, none of these Courts' cases has ever involved requiring somebody to create speech and contribute that speech to an expressive event to which they are deeply opposed. And if I could go back to my example, when you force that African-American sculptor to sculpt that cross for a Klan service, you are transforming his message. He may want his cross to send the message of peace and harmony. By forcing him to combine it with that expressive event, you force him to send a message of hate and division.

    JUSTICE KENNEDY: What would the government - what would the government's position be if you prevail in this case, the baker prevails in this case, and then bakers all over the country received urgent requests: Please do not bake cakes for gay weddings. And more and more bakers began to comply.