Intention And Result at Seven Pines | Eastern North Carolina Now

   Publisher's note: The article below appeared in John Hood's daily column in his publication, the Carolina Journal, which, because of Author / Publisher Hood, is inextricably linked to the John Locke Foundation.

    RALEIGH     Today is the sesquicentennial of the first day of the Battle of Seven Pines. It was a key moment in the brief history of the Confederate States of America, the long history of the United States of America, and the very long history of unintended consequences.

    Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had the right intention when initiating the battle, which lasted two days. Union Gen. George B. McClellan had initially landed his numerically superior force at the tip of the Virginia Peninsula in March 1862. McClellan's goal was to move his forces up the peninsula to the northwest, defeat any Confederate armies that stood in his way, and capture the capital city of Richmond.

    But a combination of valiant Confederate defenses and Johnston's skillful, orderly retreats in front of the advancing Union columns had served to make McClellan increasingly nervous about his Peninsula Campaign. He began to imagine that his Confederate adversaries outnumbered him, that he needed more men and supplies, and that the campaign would take far longer than he originally planned.

    McClellan's fantasies gave the Confederates a useful assist, but they didn't change the facts on the ground. The Union forces were numerically superior. And while Johnston had proved himself good at orderly retreats - not just during this campaign but throughout the war - they would not ensure victory for the Confederacy. If he retreated all the way into Richmond, Johnston knew that a siege would follow. The prospect of surviving it was dim.

    So Johnston decided to attack. That was the right decision. But he bungled both his battle plan and his instructions to subordinates, including Gen. James Longstreet. The plan was too complicated to be executed effectively by what was still a largely inexperienced Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate attacks ended up in the wrong place at the wrong time. And some of the divisional officers didn't realize Longstreet was supposed to be in tactical command of the main thrust.

    Neither of the opposing commanders, Johnston and McClellan, really knew what was going on during most of the first day of the battle, May 31. Despite the ragged nature of their assaults, the Confederates had some initial successes. Late in the afternoon, Johnston figured out what was happening and led the Confederate reserve into the fray. These units were then hit by a sizable Union counterattack near Fair Oaks Station.

    I have a particular interest in two of the five Confederate brigades involved in the Fair Oaks firefight. One was the Texas Brigade, led by Gen. John B. Hood, a cousin of mine. The other was the brigade led by Gen. Johnston Pettigrew, a North Carolina native whose regiments included the 22nd North Carolina. My great-great grandfather, Wilburn Suddreth, was a lieutenant in the 22nd North Carolina. My great-great uncle, Gaston Hood, was a sergeant in Suddreth's company.

    The fighting at Fair Oaks Station was bloody. One of the Union's brigade commanders was wounded. Three of the Confederate's brigade commanders were also killed or wounded, including Pettigrew. The 22nd North Carolina sustained about 200 casualties, including Lt. Suddreth, shot in the shoulder and involuntarily retired from service as a result. Gaston Hood survived the battle intact but was killed a few weeks later during the subsequent Seven Days series of battles near Richmond.

    Hood didn't die under Johnston's command, however. This is what made the battle of Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks, as the Yankees called it) so significant. The outcome was inconclusive from a tactical standpoint. But near the end of the fighting, Gen. Johnston was himself seriously wounded in the shoulder and chest. After Johnston's removal to Richmond, Confederate President Jefferson Davis had to choose a replacement to lead the Confederate armies defending the capital. He chose Robert E. Lee - who proved to be a more successful commander. Lee's Seven Days campaign in late June 1862, while costly, broke the Union advance and caused McClellan to lose his nerve. Richmond was saved, and the war prolonged.

    In a sense, Johnston's attack at Seven Pines accomplished its objective. But it did so in a manner he couldn't have anticipated: By getting himself replaced with a better leader.